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Abstract 
 
We assess the comparative advantage and protection of China’s major agricultural 
crops using a modified Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) and 1996 to 1998 data. We 
consider the following commodities: early indica rice, late indica rice, japonica rice, 
south wheat, north wheat, south corn, north corn, sorghum, soybean, rapeseed, cotton, 
tobacco, sugarcane, and a subset of fruits and vegetables. Consistent with the intuition of 
the simple Heckscher-Ohlin model, the results strongly suggest that China has a 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive crops, and a disadvantage in land-intensive 
crops. Specifically, land-intensive grain and oilseed crops are less socially profitable than 
fruits and vegetables. Within the grain sector, high quality rice and high quality north 
wheat have a more comparative advantage than early indica rice and south wheat, 
respectively. The findings suggest that China’s current grain self-sufficiency policy 
incurs efficiency losses. Our results shed light on likely changes in agricultural trade 
patterns in China, if accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) takes place. We 
also stress the need for greater input productivity in grain production to improve its 
competitiveness if China keeps its food security policy. 
 
Key Words: China, agriculture, comparative advantage, protection, DRC, EPC, 
agricultural trade. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, 
AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE: 
A POLICY ANALYSIS MATRIX FOR CHINESE AGRICULTURE 
 
Our paper is an empirical contribution to the debate on China’s integration into the 
world economy. We assess the comparative advantage and protection of China’s major 
agricultural crops using a modified Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) and 1996 to 1998 data. 
We consider the following commodities: early indica rice, late indica rice, japonica rice, 
south wheat, north wheat, south corn, north corn, sorghum, soybeans, rapeseed, cotton, 
tobacco, sugarcane, and a subset of fruits and vegetables. Consistent with the intuition of 
the simple Heckscher-Ohlin model, the results strongly suggest that China has a 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive crops, and a disadvantage in land-intensive 
crops. Specifically, land-intensive oilseed crops (soybeans and rapeseed) and grains 
(wheat, corn, and sorghum) are less socially profitable than are labor-intensive fruits and 
vegetables, tobacco, cotton, and japonica rice. These findings suggest that China’s grain 
self-sufficiency policy induces major efficiency losses and that significant gains in factor 
productivity will have to take place to improve the competitiveness of these crops, if food 
security objectives remain unchanged after accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  
We find that agricultural protection in China is still reminiscent of the import-
substitution era and reveals systematic patterns of input subsidization and output taxation 
through foreign exchange rate rationing (Krueger et al. 1991; Huang 2000). Effective 
protection patterns reveal the high effective protection enjoyed by corn, sorghum, and 
sugarcane, and the effective taxation burdening tobacco, cotton, and japonica rice. 
Patterns of comparative disadvantage and protection mirror each other. The least 
competitive crops tend to be the most protected ones. 
China’s accession to the WTO requires the eventual elimination or reduction of 
many policies distorting trade, production, and consumption of agricultural commodities, 
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which are inconsistent with WTO principles (Tuan and Cheng 1999). Reducing domestic 
and trade distortions would realign relative costs to relative world prices, reduce but not 
eliminate the production of importables (grains, oilseeds), and promote the production of 
exportables, such as vegetables, fruits, tobacco, and cotton. Hence, with accession to the 
WTO, China’s agricultural trade patterns would be affected, increasing its dependence on 
world grain and oilseed markets to satisfy its domestic demand, and to absorb its 
exportable agricultural production (Garnaut et al. 1996; Carter et al. 1996; Carter and Li 
2000; Wang 1997; Wailes et al. 1998; Lu 1997). In the long run, major factor 
productivity gains in agriculture would alter these predicted specialization patterns as 
shown by Huang and Chen (1999), and Huang et al. (1999). Realizing these productivity 
gains is a major challenge, in terms of policymaking and factor accumulation.  
China’s rapid economic growth and gradual transition towards a market economy 
have brought about significant changes in production and consumption patterns and 
somewhat in trade behavior in agriculture. However, the government, to a considerable 
extent, still distorts and controls input supply, output procurement, and trade flows—
especially in the grain sector.  
The switch from a large exporter to a large importer of grains, which occurred in 
1994 and 1995, led some researchers to believe that China was beginning to rely more on 
relative scarcity signals to determine its trade patterns. However, alarmist warnings from 
outsiders about China’s inability to feed itself led to a new agricultural policy bias 
promoting grain production and self-sufficiency (Brown 1995). Under a new grain 
policy, provincial governors were given responsibility to maintain the “grain bag.” The 
policy bias toward grains shifted resource allocation away from other crops to grains. As 
a result, the harvested area for rice, wheat, and corn was increased from 80.3 million 
hectares (mha) to 86.1 mha between 1994 and 1999. The reverse pattern occurred for the 
production of several crops competing with grains in the land allocation: for example, the 
harvested area for cotton decreased from 5.53 mha to 3.75 mha during the same period.  
In the following sections, we first review recent policy changes affecting Chinese 
agriculture. Next, we introduce the policy analysis matrix framework. We follow with a 
Food Self-Sufficiency, Comparative Advantage, and Agricultural Trade  /  9 
presentation of the data used, and of our estimates of protection and comparative 
advantage. We conclude the paper with remarks on the implications of our findings.  
 
Overview of China’s Agricultural Policy 
China’s leaders, as in many Asian countries, have been defining food security as 
grain security, bringing policymakers’ active interference in grain markets and trade 
(Crook 1997, 1999). From the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, the people’s communes 
controlled all aspects of the rural economy. Government-owned institutions managed the 
production and circulation of agricultural products from farm gate to consumers, and the 
century-old open marketing system was closed. The government strictly controlled the 
prices of farm products and cropping areas. 
After rural economic reform was initiated in the early 1980s, the commune system 
was abandoned in favor of households as decision units under the “household 
responsibility system” (HRS). The old open marketing system was allowed to revive. 
Under the HRS, farm households were permitted to sign long-term land contracts to 
cultivate specific plots. Farmers were given somewhat greater production and marketing 
discretion. They were able to produce whatever they wanted and to sell their goods 
through local open markets as long as they delivered specified quotas to the government.  
China’s reform can be divided into several episodes (Carter et al. 1996; Huang 
1998). In the period of 1978 to 1984, the household responsibility system was adopted 
and procurement prices and above-quota price premiums were increased. Centralized 
sown-area plans were relaxed to a certain extent, and procurement quotas were gradually 
reduced, and even abolished, for some commodities (Carter et al. 1996).  
From 1985 to 1988, urban reforms were initiated. In agriculture, policy reform 
focused on liberalizing the mandatory procurement system, except for grain and cotton. 
In 1985, rural market reforms were introduced to abolish the unified purchasing and 
marketing system. State purchases of grain, cotton, and edible oilseeds were maintained, 
but quantities and prices of state purchases were negotiated between the government and 
farmers. The additional unit price for grain was significantly reduced. Meanwhile, a 
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number of other policies were implemented to encourage diversification of non-grain 
production (Huang 1998).  
Starting in 1992, the Chinese government started market reforms to reduce the 
burden of the grain subsidies and to improve the economic efficiency of grain markets. 
Domestic prices for grain started to reflect movements in demand and supply in the 
domestic markets. As these market reforms accelerated in 1993, most provinces began to 
phase out the grain ration system that allowed urban consumers to purchase grain at low 
fixed prices. The government started implementing policies that placed grain production 
and procurement, at least partially, on a more market-oriented basis. These reforms led to 
resources being reallocated from grain production toward other crops. The market 
reforms led many observers to believe that China would steadily pursue an economic 
course based on free markets and comparative advantage.  
During 1994 and 1995, many analysts in and outside of China questioned the 
country’s capacity to produce enough grain to meet growing consumption requirements 
(e.g. Brown 1995; and Johnson 1994 for a dissenting view). Various research 
organizations including the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and the Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute (FAPRI) projected Chinese grain imports would reach 22 to 25 million metric 
tons (mmt) by 2005 and 40 to 45 mmt by 2020. 
These reports might have had a sobering effect on the central leaders, pushing them 
to initiate the “governors’ grain bag responsibility system,” a policy designed to promote 
self-sufficiency in domestic grains at the provincial level. In this policy, various policy 
instruments were employed to boost grain output in 1995 and 1996. Under this policy, 
provincial governors assumed the sole responsibility of grain production and raised grain 
self-sufficiency rates. Each provincial government had the responsibility for  
(a) guaranteeing that a certain percentage of sown area is reserved for grains,  
(b) improving crop yields, insuring that local grain stocks are maintained, and  
(c) establishing and maintaining a local grain risk fund that can be drawn upon 
before central government resources in the event of a disaster.  
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In 1996, faced by high international grain prices, policymakers sharply increased 
quota prices for grains to stimulate grain production to assure adequate food supplies. As 
a result of good weather and higher prices, record grain production occurred in 1996. 
Large supplies began to depress prices in 1997 and a protected price was introduced, 
under which farmers would receive a minimally acceptable grain price floor covering 
their costs of production. Provinces added subsidies, including ones for chemical 
fertilizers, to their fixed-quota grain purchase price. 
The 1998 grain reforms aimed at strengthening state control over the national grain 
system away from market forces. Grain trading by private companies was officially 
banned but not thoroughly enforced (Huang 2000b). Farmers were supposed to sell their 
grain-to-grain bureau stations, except for small amounts that could be sold in local 
markets. In reality, private traders bought large amounts of low quality wheat and early 
indica rice. 
In 1999, the government started another new reform of China’s grain marketing 
system, in the name of reducing government costs. On paper, the new grain reform 
allows more differentiation of procurement prices based on grain quality, encouraging 
greater production of other crops besides cereal grains, and granting grain companies 
more discretion over procurement. In practice, transactions between private traders and 
farmers went on a free-market basis for most grains (Huang 2000b). Whereas grain 
bureaus have limited capacity to administer quality differentials, the market transactions 
do reflect some premia for quality. 
Price support measures in Chinese agriculture involve various border controls on 
trade, and state controls over domestic producer prices through procurement policies. The 
central government controls international trade in almost all major agricultural products. 
These controls break the link between world prices and the prices paid by consumers and 
received by producers for most agricultural commodities. China conducts a large share of 
its international trade through state trading enterprises (STEs). The Cereal, Oil, and 
Foodstuffs Importing and Exporting Corporation (COFCO) is a giant corporation playing 
a key role in China’s food trade (Carter et al. 1998). While the trade system for many 
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other tradable products in China has undergone a big change, its foreign grain trade 
system is still centralized.  
Since 1986, China has reapplied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and its successor, the WTO. Negotiations for China’s membership are ongoing. 
The U.S.–China agreement, signed in Beijing on November 15, 1999, signaled China’s 
desire and commitment to participate in the global trade community. Based on the 
agreement, China has committed to cut agriculture tariffs by more than one-half on many 
products beginning in the year 2000 and continuing through 2004. China committed to 
end its system of discriminatory licensing and import bans for bulk commodities, and it 
will establish significant and growing tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for state-traded 
commodities such as wheat, corn, cotton, rice, and soybean oil. The within-quota tariffs 
will be low, between 1 and 3 percent.  
Upon accession, China has committed to not use export subsidies for agricultural 
products and will cap and then reduce trade-distorting domestic subsidies. China will 
eliminate scientifically unjustified restrictions on agricultural products. For example, 
China agreed to the removal of scientifically unjustified restrictions on imports of U.S. 
wheat and made a commitment to lift its ban on imports of citrus fruit from California, 
Arizona, Texas, and Florida.  
In summary, despite substantial rural and economic reforms, which have occurred 
since 1978, there is still a significant degree of state intervention in Chinese agriculture. 
Cropping patterns are still partly determined by nonmarket influences such as the state 
purchase contracts and control of trade flows, the associated input distribution systems, 
and the state-controlled production centers for priority commodities.  
 
The Policy Analysis Matrix and Measures 
of Comparative Advantage and Protection 
We use the PAM framework developed by Monke and Pearson (1998), augmented 
by a recent development in price distortion analysis brought by Masters and Winter-
Nelson (1995), which accounts for the valuation of nontraded inputs. The PAM has been 
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applied to several countries (see, for example, Barichello et al. 1998; Nelson and 
Panggabean 1991; Yao 1997; Yao and Tinprapha 1995). 
The PAM framework involves the derivation of several important indicators of 
protection and comparative advantage. As shown in Table 1, the PAM is a product of two 
accounting identities. The first one defines profit as the difference between revenues and 
costs, measured in either private or social terms. The second identity measures the effects 
of distortions (distorting policies and/or market failures) as the difference between 
observed values and social values as indicated by the divergences raw in the PAM. These 
divergences are approximations because social values are evaluated at the initial distorted 
levels of outputs and inputs. Hence, the PAM provides guidance for incremental changes 
rather than wholesale ones. 
 
Table 1. Policy analysis matrix 
  Costs  
  
Revenues 
Tradable 
Inputs 
Domestic 
Factors 
 
Profits 
Valued at private prices A B C D1 
Valued at social prices E F G H2 
Divergences I3 J4 K5 L6 
Source: Based on Monke and Pearson (1998). 
1Private profits, D, equal A minus B minus C.  
2Social profits, H, equal E minus F minus G.  
3Output transfers, I, equal A minus E.  
4Input transfers, J, equal B minus F.  
5Factor transfers, K, equal C minus G.  
6Net policy transfers, L, equal D minus H. 
 
The data in the first row provide a measure of private profitability (D), defined as the 
differences between observed revenues (A) and costs (B+C) valued at actual market 
prices. Measures A, B, C, and D reflect transfers and taxes. They show the 
competitiveness of the agricultural system, given current technologies, output values, 
input costs, and policy transfers. The second row of the matrix in Table 1 calculates 
social profitability measured at “social” prices that reflect social opportunity costs. 
Efficient outcomes are achieved when an economy aligns its private price signals to 
social prices. Social profits measure efficiency and provide a measure of comparative 
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advantage. At the margin, a positive social profit indicates that the system uses scarce 
resources efficiently and the commodity has a static comparative advantage. When social 
profits are negative, a sector cannot sustain its current output without assistance from the 
government, with a resulting waste. The cost of domestic production exceeds the cost of 
importing at the margin.  
Three coefficients are used to compare the extent of policy transfers or policy 
incentives between agricultural commodities. The nominal protection coefficient (NPC) 
is a ratio that contrasts an observed (private) price with a comparable world (social) price. 
This ratio indicates the impact of policy on divergence between the two prices for output 
(NPCO) and tradable inputs (NPCI). Subsidies to output are indicated by NPCO larger 
than one, and inputs subsidies lead to NPCI smaller than one. The EPC is a ratio of value 
added in private prices (A-B) to value added in world prices (E-F). This coefficient 
indicates the degree of policy transfer from output and tradable input distortions. A value 
greater than one indicates a net subsidy to value added.  
Three indicators are used to compare the relative efficiency or comparative 
advantage between agricultural commodities. The first indicator is the domestic resource 
cost (DRC). The DRC is defined as G/(E-F) and indicates whether the use of domestic 
factor is sociably profitable (DRC<1) or not (DRC>1). It has been widely used in 
developing countries to measure efficiency or comparative advantage and guide policy 
reforms (World Bank 1991; Appleyard 1987; Morris 1990; Gonzales et al. 1993; Alpine 
and Pickett 1993). However, the DRC may be biased against activities that rely heavily 
on domestic nontraded factors, i.e., land and some subsets of labor. A good alternative for 
the DRC is the social cost-benefit ratio (SCB), which accounts for all cost and avoids 
classification errors in the calculation of DRC (Masters and Winter-Nelson 1995). SCB is 
defined as (F+G)/E. Land is a more restricted factor than other domestic factors in 
China’s crop production (7 percent world land and 25 percent world population). 
Therefore another indicator, the SCB without land-cost (LSB) is used to measure the 
return to this fixed factor for this study. LSB is defined as (E+G without land cost)/E.  
Higher values of SCB and LSB indicate stronger competitiveness. 
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Data Sources, Modeling Assumptions, and Results 
The basic information needed for compiling a PAM are yields, input requirements, 
and the market and social prices of inputs and outputs. The major sources of data used for 
the private account in the PAM are 1996, 1997, and 1998 farm household survey data on 
China’s cost-of-production. The survey was conducted by China’s Price Bureau in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of 
Domestic Trade, the China Silk Import and Export General Company, the China 
Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives, China’s Tobacco Administration 
Bureau, China’s Chinese Medicine Administration Bureau, and China’s Light Industry 
General Committee. The survey has been carried out for decades. Many of the same 
households are included in the survey each year. The number of households in the survey 
varies across agricultural activities, according to the relative importance of each activity 
in each household. Part of the data is available in China’s Rural Statistical Yearbook 
(China’s State Statistical Bureau, various issues). 
The choice of social prices has a significant impact on the calculation of the PAM. 
We use the world price as a reference price for most commodities in the study. The U.S. 
FOB Gulf prices are used as reference prices for wheat, corn, sorghum, and soybeans. 
The cash Vancouver price, the Cotlook A Index, and FOB Caribbean price are 
represented as the reference prices for rapeseed, cotton, and sugar, respectively. These 
world prices are obtained from FAPRI. Rice quality varies among the different varieties 
grown in China, as well as in other countries. Using a reference world price for rice raises 
quality differential problems. To avoid quality differentials, we use China’s unit value of 
exports as the reference price for the different types of rice. For the same reason, we use 
the unit value exported from China as the reference price for tobacco leaves because a 
representative world price for leaf tobacco is hard to identify. The unit values are 
calculated as the value of the exported commodity divided by the total quantity exported 
from China. The unit value data come from China’s Customs Statistics Yearbook 
(Customs General Administration of PRC 1997). Vegetable and fruits markets are free 
markets in China with no explicit price distortions during the study period. The domestic 
prices for fresh apples, fresh oranges, Chinese cabbage, and green beans are used as an 
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approximation of social prices for these vegetables and fruits. Hence, we abstract from 
second-round effects of distortions in other markets on these fruit and vegetable prices. 
The world prices are adjusted to be compared at the farm gate by first adding to them 
(subtracting) the international transportation cost of the commodity from (to) the 
originating market to (from) the domestic market. The transportation cost is assumed to 
be the ocean freight rates from the United States to China for imported commodities. The 
transportation cost for exported commodities is assumed to be one-half of these freight 
rates since most of China’s agricultural products in this study go to neighboring 
countries. The data on the ocean freight rates were obtained from the USDA. Social 
prices at the farm gate are then calculated by subtracting the domestic marketing cost to 
the board prices. The domestic marketing costs are assumed to be equal to 10 percent of 
the border price, which is approximately equal to the difference between domestic 
wholesale price and producer price. 
Reference prices in U.S. dollar terms are converted to China’s currency, the RMB. 
China maintains fixed foreign exchange rate policy and limited currency convertibility. 
Starting in the late 1980s, China had dual exchange rates: official and secondary. Market-
determined exchange rates existed alongside the overvalued fixed-official rates in the so-
called two-tiered exchange rate system. While the overvalued official exchange rates 
distorted trade conducted by state trading companies, the share of transactions made at 
market-determined rates gradually increased (World Bank 1994; USDA 1998). With 
roughly 80 percent of all trade transactions taking place at the market exchange rate, 
China’s government decided in 1994 to unify the two exchange rates. The official 
currency was devalued to the then market rate of 8.7 RMB per U.S. dollar. China did not 
give up its fixed exchange rate policy after 1994: the new rate is still pegged to the U.S. 
dollar. There is a consensus view that China’s currency is overvalued (Yin and Stoever 
1994; Shuguang et al. 1999).  
Adjusting the exchange rate for the impacts of output price distortions and 
macroeconomic policy effects is a complex task. In this study, we assume that the 1994 
unified exchange rate was a shadow exchange rate, with relative purchase power parity 
holding between China and the United States. We calculate the shadow nominal 
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exchange rates based on the real effective exchange rates from 1994 to 1997 from the 
World Bank (World Bank 1996, 1997, 1998). The estimated shadow nominal exchange 
rates are 9.41 RMB/U.S.$, 10.13 RMB/U.S.$, 10.58 RMB/U.S.$, and 10.31 RMB/U.S.$ 
for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively. The domestic prices and calculated social 
prices are reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. 1996 to 1998 private and social prices for commodities in China (Yuan/mt) 
 1996 1997 1998 
Commodity Private Social Private Social Private Social 
Rice  1626  2597  1394  2408  1350  2040 
Early Indica  1572  1679  1302  1316  1189  1311 
Late Indica  1540  2462  1369  2281  1342  1995 
Japonica  1800  3564  1508  3509  1498  2714 
Wheat  1620  1723  1402  1603  1332  1357 
Corn  1145  1060  1113  923  1076  774 
Sorghum  900  968  888  871  886  719 
Soybeans  2965  3113  3006  2925  2262  2540 
Rapeseed  2527  3176  2528  3120  2648  2707 
Cotton  14392  14790  14104  15194  11876  15066 
Tobacco  9834  8266  7529  12066  5679  9173 
Sugarcane  315  225  253  219  219  167 
Apples  1371  1371  1081  1081  1004  1004 
Oranges  1647  1647  1069  1069  1537  1537 
Cabbage  359  359  477  477  392  392 
Green Beans  1178  1178  1334  1334  1133  1133 
Source: Calculated by authors. 
 
Input shadow prices are also required for the PAM. China imported chemical 
fertilizer, plastic materials, and pesticides from international markets. The shadow prices 
for chemical fertilizer, plastic materials, and pesticides are the respective import parity 
prices at the farm gate.  
There are differences in private labor costs among crops. The private labor wage is 
influenced by noncropping and off-farm opportunities. The maximum wage rate in the 
crop sectors is used as the social cost of labor for the study. 
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Following Monke and Pearson (1989), the social valuation of land in China is 
calculated based on the social profits before land cost, a measure of land rents. Valuation 
of land is a difficult exercise. For example, the social value of land devoted to green bean 
production is much higher than for other crops. However, vegetable crops require 
conditions of financial and production management that are very different from the 
conditions for other field crops. In the short run, farmers cannot readily convert to green 
beans. Hence the highest land valuation cannot be used as a short-run indicator of 
opportunity cost of land within a region. Using the same criteria of social profit before 
land cost yields a negative social value for land for some crops. We follow a conservative 
and resistant approach by using a weighted average of measures from rice, wheat, corn, 
sorghum, soybeans, cotton, tobacco, sugarcane, and cabbage for all commodities.  
The next step in the analysis involves the disaggregation of nontraded and traded 
inputs. This step is necessary to permit identification of tradable-input and domestic-
factor divergences. We decompose both total private and total social costs into their 
domestic factor and tradable-input components. Many classes of domestic factors could 
be recognized. Decomposing all input costs into their exact domestic factor and tradable-
input components is a tedious task, which often only has a trivial effect on results (Monke 
and Pearson 1989). We assume that labor, land, farm capital depreciation, animal power, 
and manure are totally nontradable. 
After prices and tradable and nontradable proportions of the inputs are estimated, the 
input and output data are used to construct the farm budgets and 57 PAMs, one per 
commodity and per year. Due to space limitation, these calculated tables are not reported 
here. However, they are available from the authors upon request. The summary results on 
protection, comparative advantage, and ranks in comparative advantage are reported in 
Tables 3 to 5, respectively.  
The NPCO in Table 3 shows that policies provided nominal protection for corn, 
sugarcane, and to a lesser extent, sorghum. In 1998, as world prices continued to drop, 
the Chinese Government actively procured and stored corn to support domestic prices. 
Provincial grain bureaus built temporary storage facilities that doubled or tripled existing 
capacity. China exported over 6 mmt of corn in calendar year 1998 with subsidies to 
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reduce stocks. The government spent US $30/mt to subsidize exports of corn in 1998 
(USDA 1998). Sugarcane and sugar beet prices have been determined mainly by market 
forces. However, the government provides a “guidance price” for sugar refineries to 
procure sugarcane and sugar beets from farmers. The “guidance prices” are allowed to 
vary within 10 percent, up or down, from the price issued by the government. Smuggling 
in sugar has been effectively cracked down since 1996. In 1999, the average sugarcane 
procurement price declined by more than 20 percent over 1998 to reflect the market 
conditions. 
Table 3. Summary results of the coefficients for Chinese agricultural protection 
(1996 to 1998) 
 NPCO NPCI EPC 
 1996 1997 1998 Avg. 1996 1997 1998 Avg. 1996 1997 1998 Avg. 
Rice 0.75 0.72 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.76 
Early Indica 0.93 0.98 0.90 0.94 0.80 0.74 0.80 0.78 0.97 1.07 0.94 0.99 
Late Indica 0.79 0.75 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.79 0.75 0.80 0.76 0.81 0.79 
Japonica 0.55 0.47 0.59 0.54 0.72 0.66 0.76 0.71 0.52 0.44 0.57 0.51 
Wheat 0.93 0.87 0.97 0.92 0.84 0.77 0.86 0.82 0.97 0.91 1.03 0.97 
Corn 1.05 1.16 1.33 1.18 0.88 0.80 0.90 0.86 1.11 1.33 1.52 1.32 
Sorghum 0.92 1.00 1.19 1.04 0.86 0.79 0.89 0.85 0.94 1.09 1.28 1.10 
Soybean 0.94 1.01 0.89 0.95 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.96 1.06 0.90 0.97 
Rapeseed 0.80 0.81 0.97 0.86 0.80 0.74 0.81 0.78 0.80 0.83 1.02 0.88 
Cotton 0.95 0.92 0.79 0.89 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.71 1.03 0.98 0.81 0.94 
Tobacco 1.19 0.63 0.62 0.81 0.77 0.71 0.77 0.75 1.28 0.61 0.59 0.83 
Sugarcane 1.13 1.14 1.28 1.18 0.89 0.82 0.90 0.87 1.25 1.31 1.53 1.36 
Source: Calculated from authors’ model. 
The policies implemented during 1996 to 1998 decreased the producer prices of 
high-quality japonica and late indica rice. This situation changed in 1999 with new prices 
reflecting the domestic market valuation of different types of rice. Leaf tobacco was 
highly taxed in China in 1997 and 1998. The private prices of wheat, soybean, rapeseed, 
and cotton are also lower than their social prices, mostly due to currency overvaluation.  
NPCI values indicate that the policies are reducing input costs for all commodities in 
the study, and the three-year average prices for tradable inputs are in the range of 70 to 87 
percent of social prices. These distortions in inputs and output markets are difficult to 
reconcile with the targeting of some obvious noneconomic objectives, such as declared 
self-sufficiency (Vousden 1990). For example, input hiring decisions are highly and 
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heterogeneously distorted. These distortions induce some unnecessary deadweight loss to 
achieve self-sufficiency. With the presumption of constant return-to-scale production, 
efficiency in production implies no input distortions.  
The values of the EPC show that there is a big difference in the degree of policy 
transfer across commodities. Corn, sugarcane, and sorghum enjoy a heavy support of 32 
percent, 10 percent, and 36 percent on three-year average, respectively for their value-
added, while japonica rice, late indica rice, and leaf tobacco face a net tax of 49 percent, 
21 percent, and 17 percent, respectively, on average on their value-added.  
The three competitive indicators—DRC, SCB, and LSB—are reported in Table 4 
and then ranked by decreasing order in Table 5. They mirror the conclusions reached 
with the protection indicators. There is a positive correlation between protection and lack 
of comparative advantage. The DRC values for japonica rice, cabbage, green beans, 
tobacco, cotton, apples, oranges, and late indicia rice are smaller than or close to one and 
clearly smaller than those for most grains and oilseeds. Most oilseeds and grain crops are 
produced inefficiently in China, with the DRC value greater than one. The results show 
government policies on grain self-sufficiency lead to significant allocative inefficiency 
and that there are significant differences in DRC values between the different types of 
rice, wheat, and corn. Japonica rice production exhibits more efficiency than early indica 
rice production. The recent relaxation of state controls on rice markets, which provide 
less incentive to produce lower quality rice, represents some improvement, however. 
North wheat and north corn are produced more efficiently than south wheat and corn. 
Hence internal patterns of regional specialization in grain production exhibit some 
inefficiency. Historically, rice production has been exhibiting a higher labor/land ratio 
than wheat and corn, which partly explains why rice is more competitive than corn and 
wheat. The respective ratios were 16.44 days/mu for rice, 10.75 days/mu for wheat, and 
14.17 days/mu for corn in 1998. 
The value of SCB ratios led to only a slight change in commodity ranking compared 
to the estimated DRCs. Japonica rice, cabbage, green beans, tobacco, cotton, apples, and 
oranges are worth expanding. Corn, wheat, rapeseed, sorghum, and soybean production 
should be reduced. The land profitability indicator slightly changes the commodity 
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ranking, but essentially brings the same message. Social profits of land devoted to fruits 
and vegetables, tobacco, cotton, and the higher quality rice are much higher than those 
for oilseeds, wheat, corn sorghum, and sugarcane. The social profits of land for south 
corn and south wheat are negative, indicating that corn and wheat production in South 
China would drastically decrease without assistance from the government. Low yields are 
the major cause of lack of competitiveness for these two products. 
 
Table 4. Results of the indicators for Chinese agricultural comparative advantage 
DRC SCB LSB  
1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998 
Rice 0.83 1.02 0.94 0.85 0.99 0.94 7650 6135 5096 
Early Indica 1.09 1.54 1.32 1.07 1.39 1.24 3377 456 1336 
Late Indica 0.95 1.14 1.06 0.96 1.11 1.04 4507 2485 2652 
Japonica 0.43 0.40 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.54 15925 16343 11896 
Wheat 1.42 1.39 1.76 1.29 1.27 1.49 1938 1634 430 
South Wheat 1.84 1.82 2.65 1.60 1.58 1.99 437 111 -1153 
North Wheat 1.24 1.17 1.43 1.17 1.12 1.28 2733 2638 1293 
Corn 1.54 2.03 1.91 1.40 1.69 1.63 1366 -244 -62 
South Corn 2.14 2.34 2.51 1.84 1.92 2.04 -699 -1162 -1298 
North Corn 1.27 1.77 1.53 1.20 1.52 1.37 2579 591 978 
Sorghum 1.48 2.45 1.62 1.37 1.98 1.48 1812 -285 785 
Soybeans 1.32 1.58 1.25 1.27 1.47 1.21 2466 1222 2015 
Rapeseed 1.74 1.65 2.19 1.59 1.51 1.90 905 732 -544 
Cotton 1.06 0.94 0.79 1.04 0.95 0.83 3411 4449 5981 
Tobacco 1.07 0.72 0.88 1.06 0.76 0.90 3073 9733 5039 
Sugarcane 1.04 1.11 1.36 1.02 1.07 1.21 3645 2308 322 
Apples 0.93 1.10 0.78 0.95 1.07 0.83 5525 1692 7240 
Oranges 0.84 1.19 0.85 0.89 1.12 0.90 7031 601 6070 
Cabbage 0.77 0.65 0.59 0.81 0.70 0.65 8307 12087 11252 
Green Beans 0.68 0.70 0.67 0.73 0.75 0.72 10842 10531 10115 
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Table 5. Comparative advantage ranking (1996 to 1998 average) 
 DRC SCB LCB 
  
Average 
(1996-98) 
 
Rank 
 
Average 
(1996-98) 
 
Rank 
Average 
(Yuan/ha) 
(1996-98) 
 
Rank 
Japonica Rice 0.43 1 0.51 1 14721 1 
Cabbage 0.67 2 0.72 2 10549 2 
Green Beans 0.68 3 0.74 3 10496 3 
Tobacco  0.89 4 0.90 4 5948 4 
Cotton 0.93 5 0.94 5 4614 6 
Apples 0.94 6 0.95 6 4819 5 
Oranges 0.96 7 0.97 7 4567 7 
Late Indica 1.05 8 1.04 8 3215 8 
Sugarcane 1.17 9 1.10 9 2092 10 
North Wheat 1.28 10 1.19 10 2221 9 
Early Indica 1.32 11 1.23 11 1723 12 
Soybeans 1.38 12 1.31 12 1901 11 
North Corn 1.52 13 1.37 13 1383 13 
Sorghum  1.85 14 1.61 14 771 14 
Rapeseed  1.86 15 1.66 15 364 15 
South Wheat 2.10 16 1.72 16 -202 16 
South Corn 2.33 17 1.93 17 -1053 17 
 
 
Conclusions 
Our results strongly suggest that, with the exception of the higher quality rice, the 
production of grains and oilseeds suffers from a comparative disadvantage over other 
crops in China. Our results are consistent with the intuition of the simple Heckscher-
Olhin model (Leamer 1984; Bowen et al. 1987; Hayes et al. 1995). China has limited 
arable land and an abundant labor force, relative to the world (Garnaut et al. 1996). These 
endowments give China a certain comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods for the 
world market (Huang 2000a; Huang and Chen 1999). Labor-intensive crops, such as 
vegetables, tobacco, cotton, and fruits are currently better suited for Chinese agriculture. 
Among grain and oilseed crops, japonica rice is the only crop that exhibits a comparative 
advantage. Among grains, rice tends to be more competitive than other crops, partly 
because it has a higher labor/land ration than wheat and corn. Hence, China’s self-
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sufficiency policy goes against its current comparative advantage, except for high quality 
rice production. 
The cotton case deserves a qualifier. Since 1996, China has expanded its production 
of cotton and has accumulated large stocks of cotton, which are reflected via expectations 
in low world prices. We can reasonably guess that the DRC for cotton evaluated at 1999 
prices would be higher that one and that China would be ill advised to further expand 
cotton production. Assessing this conjecture, however, requires data not yet available. 
Further, we can conclude that grain self-sufficiency policies reduce allocative 
efficiency twice. First, self-sufficiency could be achieved with smaller deadweight losses 
by reducing input market distortions. The latter distortions are inconsistent with 
predictions of the targeting principle for self-sufficiency. In addition, any noneconomic 
objective is inherently costly even with proper policy instrument targeting. The recurrent 
large levels of inventory holdings suggest that the targeting was not optimum, but rather 
an economic aberration guided by old policy reflexes. Chinese grain production was and 
is sufficient to meet domestic food demand (Johnson 1994, 1999). Our results are also in 
agreement with recent findings obtained by Estrin (1990) using a stochastic production 
frontier approach to grain output. The promotion of grain production and the pursuit of 
self-sufficiency in China are inefficient.  
While static efficiency gains in grain production could be achieved in the short run 
with a reform of distortions, long run gains are possible through greater factor 
productivity. This dynamic perspective on comparative advantage of grain production is 
particularly relevant in the context of China’s accession to the WTO. If China persists 
with its food security objective, higher productivity gains will have to occur in grain 
production, or else large grain imports will take place as implied by WTO accession. The 
substantial productivity gains of land and labor that have occurred the last 20 years have 
relied strongly on increased use of fertilizer and chemicals (Fan and Pardey 1997; Huang 
and Rozelle 1996). Eventually, these two sources of productivity gains will become 
exhausted. Significant investments in agricultural research and infrastructure, especially  
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irrigation,1 have to take place (Huang and Chen 1999; Huang et al. 1999). Further, the 
capital intensity of agriculture will have to increase to foster substitution possibilities 
between machinery capital and relatively unskilled labor (Johnson 2000). More human 
capital will be required as well for this substitution to take place. The current state of 
credit and land markets in China makes this capitalization of agriculture difficult and 
hence, a major challenge to Chinese policymakers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 The improvements in irrigation infrastructure are especially acute in the context of grain production in 
Northeast and North China. Over the long term, the potential to increase higher quality grain production faces 
increased water constraints because both agricultural and nonagricultural uses have put high pressure on 
available water resources over the past 20 years. The latter have sharply cut river flows and drawn down aquifer 
levels (Crook and Diao 2000). 
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